The purpose of the article was to determine the relationship between the organizational culture and the institutional management of the "Enrique López Albújar" Educational Institution, Piura. Work is worked under a quantitative approach, descriptive and correlational scope, 40 teachers participated as a sample. Among the results, it was found that there is no significant relationship between organizational culture and institutional management, which did not allow validating the research hypothesis; However, a significant relationship between norms and customs with institutional management was (...) found; which concludes in compliance with the norms and good customs based on values. (shrink)

According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers (...) hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems. (shrink)

Coherentists fail to distinguish between the individual revision of a conviction and the intersubjective revision of a rule. This paper fills this gap. A conviction is a norm that, according to an individual, ought to be ascribed to a provision. By contrast, a rule is a judicially ascribed norm that controls a case and is protected by the formal principles of competence, certainty, and equality. A revision of a rule is the invalidation or modification such a judicially ascribed norm, provided (...) that the judge meets the burden of argumentation of formal principles. Thus, judges can revise their convictions without changing the law. (shrink)

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the early 21st century (...) since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s *Knowledge and Its Limits*. This article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justified belief than are covered here, but the survey is instructive because it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. This entry concludes with a reflection about the extent to which the short history of, arguably, failed attempts to secure an unproblematic knowledge-first account of justified belief has begun to resemble the older Gettier dialectic. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo presenta un panorama más amplio de la filosofía de Slavoj Žižek, mostrando que es parte de un grupo más amplio que denominamos “Escuela eslovena”. Es así que el artículo está compuesto por dos partes. La primera dedicada a mostrar el contexto histórico de emergencia de la Escuela eslovena. La segunda parte sostiene dos tesis: 1) hay una Escuela eslovena como sujeto impersonal que implica que leer a uno de sus miembros hace más comprensible a otro; y, 2) (...) a pesar de que no encontramos conceptos propios de esta Escuela es posible encontrar rasgos, operaciones y lecturas en común entre ellos. (shrink)

RESUMEN: El texto pretende desmitificar que los sesgos son elementos negativos dentro de la toma de decisiones. Por tanto, es factible que los sesgos formen parte del razonamiento probatorio a través de la abducción, para lo cual en muestra se analizan dos casos de feminicidio suscitados en la jurisdicción mexicana e interamericana.ABSTRACT: The text aims to demystify that biases are negative elements in decision making. Therefore, it is feasible that the biases form part of the probative reasoning through abduction. Specifically, (...) they are analyzed two cases of feminicide of mexican and interamerican jurisdiction. PALABRAS CLAVE: ciencia, sesgos, abducción, interpretación, género.KEYWORDS: science, bias, abduction, interpretation, gender. (shrink)

Busca-se neste artigo problematizar a manifestação da colonialidade nas práticas pedagógicas de uma instituição de educação infantil situada em contexto periférico a partir da percepção de professoras e famílias. A argumentação e análise teórica adotada partem dos estudos da infância e teoria decolonial/contracolonial. Serão analisadas as conversas estabelecidas com adultos participantes da pesquisa, sendo quatro entrevistas realizadas com professoras e mães de crianças de uma instituição de educação infantil de contexto periférico e negro, localizada no município de Betim – MG. (...) A partir dos sujeitos da pesquisa são apresentadas denúncias que configuram o que chamamos de colonialidade da educação infantil. A alimentação das crianças foi destacada, pelas professoras e mães, como um dos momentos da rotina pedagógica que gerava grande incômodo devido a práticas de violência com as crianças. Esta violência compõe o que se denomina como adultocentrismo, que existe para posicionar as crianças às margens do projeto civilizatório ocidental, sendo que nestes termos o adultocentrismo pode ser também compreendido como a peste branca produzida pela matriz eurocêntrica e colonial. Atuar contra a colonialidade e contra o adultocentrismo é defender uma experiência concreta e histórica para a educação infantil e não apenas teórica. Cada vez mais é preciso avançar na formação das professoras de forma conscientizadora quanto a emergência da contracolonização da educação infantil em articulação com o projeto de sociedade emancipatória para todos e todas. (shrink)

In this paper we claim that pragmatist philosophical practice is incompatible with scientistic philosophy. The kind of pragmatism used for making this case follows the spirit and method of philosophical pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and a related pragmatic tradition, Confucian Philosophy. Pragmatism starts from immediate experience, and refuses to cleave off the reality and salience of what is found in such experience in the process of thinking. Pragmatism also concerns itself with social problems, broadly conceived. (...) In contrast to this focus on immediate experience, the influence of science in much philosophizing involves a kind of scientism through which the relevance, value, and even reality of experience is brought into question. It also concerns itself with a narrowly defined set of so-called philosophical problems. In this regard, pragmatist philosophical practice is fundamentally opposed to scientistic philosophical practice. We will start by modelling the kind of philosophical practice that stems from pragmatism, and the role of immediate experience in it. Subsequently, we will introduce two modes of philosophizing that diminish if not negate the role of experience. One is bald naturalist philosophizing, and the other is a priori scientific philosophizing. In the last section, we will show how main commitments of both of these traditions are incompatible with a pragmatist philosophy that remains committed to the original impulse of pragmatism. (shrink)

The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss (...) concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off. (shrink)